British clinics delivering cosmetic surgery were thrown into crisis by the decision last month of the French government to fund the removal of thousands of breast implants manufactured by the now-closed French company Poly Implant Prostheses (PIP). The implants were found to have used industrial grade silicone made for use in mattresses. Continue reading
Thanks to new disclosure requirements from the University of Wisconsin’s doctor group, the Wisconsin State Journal‘s David Wahlberg was able to report that 10 UW-Madison doctors received $48,000 or more from drug and device companies.
Thomas Zdeblick, M.D., pulled in almost $1.7 million. In fact, most of them were orthopedic surgeons, a fact which shouldn’t surprise anyone who’s been following the State Journal‘s conflict-of-interest work, as well as that of the Journal Sentinel‘s John Fauber.
Before 2010, doctors only had to report that they’d received more than $20,000 from such industry associations. Now, they have to disclose specific amounts. The disclosure requirements are currently the most prominent component of the schools’ crackdown of conflicts of interest, but activists say conflict disclosure is only half the battle.
A policy adopted in 2009 by the UW Medical Foundation, the university’s doctor group, bans doctors from doing promotional speeches for companies and accepting gifts such as free meals. Surgeons, however, can use materials created by device companies to conduct government-required training sessions, Golden said.
The foundation’s policy prohibits doctors from receiving royalties for using products at UW Health, which removes any incentive to use the doctors’ products instead of others, Golden said.
An interesting side note: UW clinics post signs detailing how patients can obtain their doctor’s disclosure form, but such requests have been few and far between, Wahlberg found “14 in 2009, 18 in 2010 and seven” in 2011.
John Fauber follows up his previous investigations into the myriad problems and conflicts of interest surrounding Medtronic’s Infuse product with a story on the emerging national epidemic of what pain specialists are calling “failed back surgery syndrome.” One local pain specialist Fauber contacted said that a full 10 percent to 15 percent of his patients suffered from the condition.
To bring the whole thing full circle, Fauber spends much of the body of this latest installment explaining how conflicts of interest and other questionable ethical situations, including off-label use, propelled the early and sustained success of Medtronic’s spine-fusion blockbuster and set the stage for the emerging pain epidemic.
Writing for The New York Times, Barry Meier and Janet Roberts analyzed a particularly tricky batch of federal reports detailing a variety of complaints with popular metal-on-metal hip replacements. They found that, since January, the FDA has received more complaints (5,000-plus) about the devices than it did, total, from 2007 to 2010.
While processing the data, the paper’s staff did their best to parse duplicate reports, international filings and other inconsistencies, but the reporters make it clear that the numbers are still best viewed in general terms. Even so, they demonstrate that the surge in complaints and lawsuits involving metal-on-metal hips — and the resulting mass defection of doctors who once implanted them — signals a broad shift in hip replacement surgery, one of the most common such procedures in the country. It also signals another blow for device manufacturers and patients, and a related windfall for the legal profession.
The vast majority of filings appear to reflect patients who have had an all-metal hip removed, or will soon undergo such a procedure because a device failed after only a few years; typically, replacement hips last 15 years or more.
The mounting complaints confirm what many experts have feared — that all-metal replacement hips are on a trajectory to become the biggest and most costly medical implant problem since Medtronic recalled a widely used heart device component in 2007. About 7,700 complaints have been filed in connection with that recall.
As problems and questions grow, most surgeons are abandoning the all-metal hips, saying they are unwilling to expose new patients to potential dangers when safer alternatives — mainly replacements that combine metal and plastic components — are available. Some researchers also fear that many all-metal hips suffer from a generic flaw. Current use of all metal devices has plummeted to about 5 percent of the market, though a few of the models are performing relatively well in select patients.
Deborah L. Shelton and Jason Grotto of the Chicago Tribune couldn’t help but wonder: How does a medical device get implanted into patients without first getting FDA approval?
Tricuspid valve in a model heart. (Photo by robswatski via Flickr)
That question led to their two-day series in late May that reported for the first time that certain heart valve repair devices had been “down-classed” from class III to class II, a regulatory category that required that they undergo less scrutiny, even though the devices are permanently implanted and life-sustaining.
One of the annuloplasty rings had been stitched into the hearts of at least 700 patients in Chicago and elsewhere without going through proper channels. In fact, even though the company could have submitted both rings for clearance through a less rigorous regulatory pathway, it didn’t even do that. In these two cases, the process was skipped in its entirety.
In this article for AHCJ members, the pair explains how they reported the story, including finding documents and persuading affected patients to speak on the record.