- http://media.apps.chicagotribune.com/flames/index.html
- http://www.chicagotribune.com/videogallery/69743455/News/Video-The-truth-about-flame-retardants
- http://media.apps.chicagotribune.com/flames/flame-retardants-hard-to-avoid.html
- http://media.apps.chicagotribune.com/flames/facts-vs-testimony.html
Provide names of other journalists involved.
George Papajohn, Kaarin Tisue, Alex Garcia, John Owens, Katie Nieland, David Eads, Joe Germuska, Chuck Burke, Brian Boyer
List date(s) this work was published or aired.
May 6, May 8, May 9, May 10, June 19, July 18, July 25, Dec. 28, Dec. 30.
Provide a brief synopsis of the story or stories, including any significant findings.
The Chicago Tribune’s “Playing With Fire” investigative series revealed how a deceptive, decades-long campaign by the chemical and tobacco industries brought toxic flame retardants into our homes and into our bodies, despite the fact that these dangerous chemicals don’t even work as promised. Significant findings included: Big Tobacco planted a lobbyist inside the National Association of State Fire Marshals and used that organization to promote flame-retardant furniture. Chemical manufacturers created a phony consumer group that stoked the public’s fear of fire to protect and expand the use of flame retardants. A noted burn surgeon who served as a star witness for the manufacturers of flame retardants gave graphic, emotional testimony before state legislatures about babies burned in fires. But the babies he described didn’t exist. The chemical industry points to a government study from the 1980s as proof that flame retardants save lives. But the study’s lead author said industry has grossly distorted his findings and that the amount of retardants used in household furniture doesn’t work. Newer studies by government researchers and independent scientists show that flame retardants provide no meaningful protection from fires. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has allowed generation after generation of flame retardants onto the market and into American homes without thoroughly assessing the health risks. The EPA promoted one chemical mixture as a safe, eco-friendly flame retardant despite grave concerns from its own scientists about potential hazards to humans and wildlife. After the first stories ran, readers asked if flame retardants were in their mattresses, especially crib mattresses. The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission said its fire-safety rules for mattresses were crafted so companies didn’t have to add chemicals and the agency had never tested baby mattresses. So the Tribune did. Lab tests showed that three popular brands contained significant amounts of a flame retardant removed from children’s pajamas over cancer concerns.
Explain types of documents, data or Internet resources used. Were FOI or public records act requests required? How did this affect the work?
To reveal the surprising role of Big Tobacco in the build-up of toxic chemicals in American homes, Callahan sifted through the 13 million records cigarette companies made public after settling lawsuits. Reluctant to alter the cigarettes that were sparking fatal house blazes, tobacco executives created a new scapegoat: the furniture catching fire. Internal memos, minutes of meetings and strategic plans showed how Big Tobacco planted its lobbyist inside the National Association of State Fire Marshals and used that organization to promote flame-retardant furniture. Roe exposed how chemical makers twisted science to promote products by dissecting numerous studies and drilling into the underlying data. One key report was so obscure it was only available at the National Library of Sweden. Roe obtained a copy and had it translated. It revealed that many wide-ranging industry claims can be traced to an analysis of just eight TV fires in Stockholm more than 15 years ago. Digging into the charts and footnotes of another deeply flawed study, he uncovered misleading conclusions by tracking the fabric used in testing to the store where it was purchased and deciphering laboratory codes. Hawthorne documented how government and independent researchers had conducted their own research of flame retardants. Previously undisclosed studies by the Consumer Product Safety Commission and Underwriters Laboratories found the chemicals provide no meaningful protection from furniture fires, undermining a key industry argument for adding flame retardants to upholstered furniture. Reporters attended obscure hearings on furniture rules to witness industry manipulation first-hand. In California, Callahan heard the chemical industry’s star witness, burn surgeon David Heimbach, tell lawmakers a gripping story about a baby girl fatally burned in her crib because of the lack of flame retardants. Callahan found other testimony by Heimbach describing different babies, all fatally burned in candle fires. The source of fire was critical to the industry because California required furniture manufacturers to pass tests involving a candle-like flame. Heimbach said all of those babies died at his Seattle hospital, and so Roe reviewed 16 years of county medical examiner records. No one had died in the manner Heimbach described. The group sponsoring Heimbach, the Citizens for Fire Safety Institute, described itself as a coalition of ordinary people dedicated to protecting families. Callahan used IRS records, corporate franchise tax reports and lobbying disclosure forms to prove that the coalition was a front group founded and funded by the three largest manufacturers of flame retardants. To document the federal government’s shortcomings, Hawthorne used FOIA to obtain previously undisclosed documents illustrating how regulators allowed generation after generation of flame retardants onto the market without thoroughly assessing the risks. The documents revealed that EPA officials had grave concerns about one flame retardant promoted as a safe, environmentally friendly chemical. They approved it anyway. In response to questions from Hawthorne about the EPA’s own documented concerns, the agency vowed to conduct a broad investigation of all brominated flame retardants. Hawthorne also reviewed more than 200 scientific studies of toxic chemicals and analyzed thousands of pages of EPA documents and government regulatory filings.
Explain types of human sources used.
Scientists who study fires and the effectiveness of flame retardants, researchers who study the health hazards posed by flame retardants, chemical industry representatives and scientists, state lawmakers and advocates who have pushed legislation and policy changes related to flame retardants, EPA officials, government consumer safety officials.
Results:
The series achieved results, including: Broad reform measures — California said it would overhaul its 1970s-era flammability standard, a change expected to take effect this summer with far-reaching consequences. It will eliminate the need for toxic retardants in furniture nationwide. The EPA said it would investigate the chemicals highlighted in the Tribune series, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission urged lawmakers to grant special authority to speed the removal of retardants from new furniture. Congressional hearings — The series sparked two U.S. Senate hearings, including one in which senators assailed executives from the world’s largest manufacturers of flame retardants. “Don’t you owe people an apology?” Sen. Barbara Boxer asked. Unprecedented Senate action — The Environment and Public Works Committee approved a sweeping overhaul of the nation’s chemical safety law — the first time since 1976 that comprehensive changes to the Toxic Substances Control Act made it out of committee. Increased transparency — The chemical industry shut the front group Citizens for Fire Safety; the University of Washington admonished Heimbach over his testimony; U.S. Sen. Dick Durbin, the assistant majority leader, demanded answers from the EPA and CPSC; and 21 legislators from 10 states called for Congressional action. Industry changes — After Tribune-sponsored lab testing, retailer Wayfair said it would stop selling Angeles mattresses, which are popular at child-care centers. Facing a tougher regulatory climate, the two largest manufacturers of a carcinogenic flame retardant the Tribune spotlighted ¬ vowed to end production of that chemical, known as chlorinated tris. The series inspired editorial writers and columnists at the the New York Times, Bloomberg, Sacramento Bee, San Jose Mercury-News and Newsday to call for action. If you want a case study of everything that is wrong with money politics, this is it,” Nicholas Kristof wrote in the New York Times. More than 100 nurses, mothers and cancer survivors marched on Capitol Hill for tougher regulations. And the Tribune received an outpouring of gratitude from readers. Wrote one: “You’ve done a tremendous justice for us all.”
Follow-up (if any). Have you run a correction or clarification on the report or has anyone come forward to challenge its accuracy? If so, please explain.
The Tribune published more than a dozen follow up stories after the initial four-day series. The stories included reaction from public officials and policy changes proposed in response to the stories. Research published after the initial stories echoed the newspaper’s findings. One peer-reviewed study raised new concerns about a flame retardant highlighted by the Tribune series. Another study found that a flame retardant voluntarily removed from children’s pajamas in the late 1970s because of health concerns has now become the most widely used chemical in residential furniture.
Advice to other journalists planning a similar story or project.
Persistence can pay off. Obscure records and databases are invaluable. In particular, the archive of tobacco industry documents and government regulatory dockets. File FOIA requests early and try to tailor the requests narrowly after conducting pre-interviews with sources. Become familiar with the work of scientists before interviewing them. They can be very helpful, especially after journalists do their homework and familiarize themselves with research.