Health Journalism Glossary

Bioterrorism

  • Infectious Diseases

A form of terrorism involving the deliberate release of biological agents, such as a virus or bacteria, or toxins to injure or kill people, with the aim of furthering personal or political agendas. This is also called germ warfare. Bioterrorism differs from other methods of terrorism in that all that is needed to turn biological material into a weapon is determination and access to medical supplies or a laboratory. Further, unlike other forms of terrorism, if a bioweapon was unleashed, it could be days or weeks before the attack is known. This means that initial victims could be incubating a disease and then carrying and spreading it to all parts of the U.S. and world before it could be stopped.

Deeper dive
Bioterrorism, the act of turning biological agents like microbes or toxins into weapons, has been used by military leaders for more than 2,000 years. One of the first known uses of bioterrorism occurred in 184 B.C., when Hannibal, the leader of Carthage (modern-day Tunisia), directed his sailors to fill earthen pots with serpents and launch them at enemy ships led by King Eumenes of Pergamum (Turkey).

During the 1960s, the U.S. military had a biological arsenal that included numerous weaponized pathogens, as did Canada, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union. But concerns about risks of such programs to society led to a 1972 U.N. Convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of infectious diseases. The agreement was signed by 103 countries, and the U.S. confiscated its arsenal of bioweapons. But the convention had no enforcement mechanism. The Soviet Union, for example, kept working on bioweapons, through a program it called Biopreparat. Not until the late 1990s, when the Soviet Union dissolved, did the U.S. learn of the program.

The U.S. helped to dismantle the Biopreparat program, but security experts believe some countries, like North Korea, are still working on bioterrorism. Further, terrorists no longer need the backing or the resources of a nation-state to build a bioterrorist weapon. With developments in technology, only determination and access to medical supplies and a laboratory are needed, as the U.S. learned in the 2001 anthrax attack.

Anthrax isn’t communicable between people, but the bacterium can be altered to easily spread through the air. When inhaled, anthrax can cause lung damage and death. Not long after the Sept. 11 terror attacks, someone altered anthrax spores and sent them to the media and members of Congress through the mail. After a years-long investigation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation declared that Bruce Ivans, an Army microbiologist, was responsible for sending the spores, which infected twenty-two people and killed five. Ivans killed himself before he was charged and doubts remain about whether he was the culprit.

The anthrax attack remains the worst bioterrorism attack in U.S. history, and national security experts worry another one could occur.

Since 2001, the government has spent billions on programs to develop a strategy for responding to a potential biological attack.

The current federal government strategy for responding to biodefense can be found at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response here.

 

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